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1. Judgement, Assertion and Knowledge1 
Judgement is the interiorisation of assertion: the inner 
notion of judgement is to be explained in terms of the outer 
notion of assertion. When someone asserts ‘Snow is 
white’, an interlocutor is entitled to ask ‘How do you know?’ 
If the asserter is not able to give grounds for his assertion, 
it has to be withdrawn. In an assertion an illocutionary 
claim that one has grounds is present; an assertion is thus 
a claim to knowledge. Not all occurrences of declarative 
sentences are asserted. In such cases the context should 
make it clear that the declarative is, for example, used to 
express mere opinion or conjecture. Whereas an assertion 
made is correct or incorrect, other uses of the declarative 
do not allow for this distinction. Just as for assertion, im-
plicit in every judgement is a claim to knowledge; judge-
ment is an epistemic notion.  
The explanation of knowledge as justified true belief is 
standard. Some philosophers, though, explain knowledge 
as grounded or evident judgement. They rightly consider 
the notion of truth to be superfluous in their explanation of 
knowledge: groundedness ensures truth.  
2. Subjective, Objective and Absolute 
Certainty 
The explanation of knowledge as evident judgement may 
be elucidated in terms of subjective, objective and abso-
lute certainty. A judgement’s objective certainty may be 
explained either as its being grounded, or as the universal 
validity of the judgement. The former explanation is found 
in the article ‘Gewissheit’ in the Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie (1974): certainty in the objective sense is 
the epistemic justification of what is known (certitudo rei 
cognitae). The latter explanation one finds in the corres-
ponding article in Eisler’s Handwörterbuch der Philosophie 
(1913): what stands fast for every possible judger is called 
‘objektive Gewissheit’. In the article ‘certainty’ in Baldwin’s 
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901) the two 
explanations are combined: “an assertion is certain when 
its content is taken to be such that it must be asserted by 
all intelligences, i.e., when its truth is taken to be assured 
by universally valid grounds.”  
A judgement is subjectively certain (sure, sicher) when 
the judger is convinced of its correctness. A judgement’s 
being subjectively certain may be the result of its being 
objectively certain. Knowledge entails belief in the sense of 
conviction. Subjective certainty may also obtain without 
objective certainty, in which case we have mere belief. 
Here (mere) belief is explained as a deprived judgement – 
a judgement for which we have no (epistemic) ground. 
Accordingly, belief is not apt for elucidating the concept of 
knowledge. Mere belief excludes knowledge.  
A judgement is absolutely certain if it is excluded from 
error. The explanation of absolute certainty as indubitibility 
is less apt, because it seems to express a psychological 
impossibility. The concept of absolute certainty can be 
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used only in a negative way: none of our judgements is 
absolutely certain, because the human judger is fallible. 
Within the Cartesian tradition where knowledge is iden-
tified with absolutely certain knowledge, objective certainty 
is often identified with absolute certainty (infallibility) and 
undubitibility. This ideal of knowledge has brought the 
explanation of knowledge as evident judgement into dis-
credit, because it leads to the problem of evidence: How 
can evidence be both epitemically accessible to the judger, 
and at the same time be a guarantee of infallible truth. The 
answer to the problem is that evidence is epistemically 
accessible to the judger, and there is no guarantee of infal-
lible truth. Those who do not distinguish between objective 
and absolute certainty consider the explanation of knowl-
edge as evident judgement to be merely subjective, for, 
pertaining to the evident judgement, there seems to be 
nothing left but subjective certainty. Given the distinction, 
the evident judgement, i.e. knowledge, can be both 
subjectively and objectively certain, without having to be 
absolutely certain.  
3. Non-Epistemic Certainty 
Declarative sentences, when used as assertions, can be 
considered as answers to a question. Implicit in a question 
is a presupposition, that itself can be considered as 
answer to a question. Not every presupposition is an 
answer to a question, though. When we have reached one 
of our absolute presuppositions (a term I borrow from 
Collingwood), such as God exists, there is no question to 
which this could be an answer. Absolute presuppositions 
are not answers to questions. Their expression as de-
clarative is artificial, for they are neither true nor false. 
Instead of saying that a certain person believes that god 
exists, we should say that he believes in God (fides, 
Glaube). God exists is not a judgement; such an absolute 
presupposition is a non-epistemic certainty. It is a certain-
ty, because we trust it; it stands fast for us. It is non-
epistemic, because the judger cannot give a ground for it, 
and is not expected to be able to give such a ground. 
When someone utters a declarative with the intention to 
express a non-epistemic certainty, we cannot meaningfully 
ask ‘How do you know?’ The certainty of absolute presup-
positions is prejudgemental; they make certain questions 
and answers (judgements) possible. Another example of 
such a certainty is belief in the evolution-theory. Such a 
certainty makes certain judgements possible, and it deter-
mines what counts as ground for a certain assertion. We 
learn these certainties from parents and teachers without 
questioning them.  
Both subjective certainty and non-epistemic certainty are 
convictions, but they are of a different type. Non-epistemic 
certainties are not judgements, because they are them-
selves not answers to questions. We cannot meaningfully 
doubt whether God exists, because such a doubt presup-
poses that ‘God exists’, or ‘God does not exist’ expresses 
a judgement. Subjective certainties are judgemental. Be-
cause declaratives standardly express epistemic certain-
ties, one is allowed to ask ‘How do you know?’ If it turns 
out that the person that has subjective certainty cannot 
give an (epistemic) ground, and thus expresses a mere 
belief, we may still ask ‘Is it true?’, or ‘How can it be 
known?’ We need an antecedent notion of non-epistemic 




certainty against the background of which such questions, 
and thus, judgement and knowledge, are possible. 
4. Wittgenstein on Judgement, Knowledge 
and Certainty 
Wittgenstein’s use of Gewissheit and Sicherheit is not sys-
tematic. Section 308 in On Certainty is crucial for under-
standing his ideas on judgement and certainty:  
‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ (‘Sicherheit’) belong to differ-
ent categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say 
‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’ (‘Sichersein’). […] What inter-
ests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we 
are interested in the fact that about certain empirical pro-
positions no doubt can exist if making judgements is to be 
possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not 
everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is 
one. 
What does it mean that knowledge and certainty belong 
to different categories? In On Certainty we do not find 
anything like the standard definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief. We do find elucidations of uses of ‘I 
know …’. Assertions that start with ‘He knows …’ are more 
complex, because they entail ‘I know …’. Wittgenstein’s 
primary interest is a first person concept of knowledge 
rather than the customary third person concept of 
knowledge. ‘I know’ often means that I have the proper 
grounds for my assertion (18; isolated numbers refer to 
sections in Wittgenstein 1969), and what is a proper 
ground is determined by the language game in question. A 
first person concept of knowledge presupposes a 
language game that belongs to a community. Giving and 
asking for grounds happens within a system that is a 
complex of language games (105). Wittgenstein’s 
elucidations of the first person concept of knowledge are a 
variant of the explanation of knowledge as grounded 
judgement. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that knowledge is 
a mental state (308). By saying ‘I know’ I do not say that I 
am in a special state (588). Its use is the same as the use 
of ‘That is’ (588). We may express this point by saying that 
‘I know’ makes explicit the knowledge claim contained in 
an assertion.  
Certainties that are Wittgenstein’s focus do not belong to 
the same category as knowledge because they are not 
judgemental certainties. Asking and giving grounds do not 
apply to them. In certain contexts empirical sentences may 
be used to express such certainties; the most famous one 
being Moore’s ‘Here is a hand’. Although we can imagine a 
context in which one’s utterance of the declarative ‘Here is 
a hand’ is used as an assertion, and is thus true or false, 
for Wittgenstein the sentence is of interest in so far as it 
expresses a norm (167): this is what we call ‘a hand’ (cf. 
Stroll 1994 and Kober 1996). This way we learn how to 
categorise. Certainties, unlike axioms, we do not learn in 
isolation; they are part of a world-view that, as a whole, is 
an unquestioned foundation, a background against which 
we can distinguish between true and false (94). A certainty 
like here is a hand thus plays the same role in relation to 
judgement as the certainty God exists mentioned in the 
former section. Another example of a certainty is that what 
has always happened, will happen again (135) – we did 
not learn it as a principle, rather we act intuitively in 
accordance with it; without it assertions about the future 
would be impossible.  
Wittgenstein says that we may be convinced of the 
rightness (‘Richtigkeit’) of a world-view by its simplicity and 
symmetry (92). If our world-view thus changes it may be 
called a conversion. Wittgenstein prefers the religious term 
‘belief’ to any psychological term for these certainties 
(459). Rightness as it is used here is essentially different 
from judgemental truth. Criteria for rightness can be 
applied only to a complete system, like the criterion of 
coherence and pragmatic criteria.  
How does Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty relate to the 
epistemic notions of certainty explained in the second 
section? On Certainty contains two passages where the 
term ‘objective certainty’ is used. Wittgenstein gives (270) 
a general quotation “I have compelling grounds for my 
certitude (Sicherheit)”. After the quote he adds that these 
grounds make the certainty objective. In the same pas-
sage he expresses the idea (273) that we may dispute 
whether something is certain: “when something is objec-
tively certain”. At first sight this seems to be in accordance 
with the epistemic meaning of the term ‘objective certainty’. 
But the examples Wittgenstein gives of objective certain-
ties do not confirm such an accordance: that if someone’s 
arm is cut off it will not grow again, and that if someone is 
beheaded is dead and will never live again. Such certain-
ties are presupposed when we make judgements. Wittgen-
stein considers these certainties to be objective in the 
sense that one has learned them from others (275). It is 
the certainty we share with all who take part in our lan-
guage games in which our experience is embedded. 
In the other passage, Wittgenstein contrasts objective 
and subjective certainty (194): 
With the word “certain” (“gewiss”) we express complete 
conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we 
seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty. 
But when is something objectively certain? When a 
mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? 
Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded? 
What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that error is 
excluded? He adds that the error has to be logically 
excluded, where ‘logic’ has a special meaning in On 
Certainty. Logic concerns the general rules of language. 
‘This is a hand’ in the proper context is an explanation of 
the word ‘hand’. It is a rule for the use of this word prior to 
any of its applications. Error is excluded because ques-
tions of truth and falsity do not arise. This kind of certainty 
does not belong to a category where error applies, 
because it is prejudgemental. In this sense Wittgenstein’s 
notion of certainty is far apart from the notion of absolute 
certainty in the traditional, epistemic sense: absolute 
certainty in the traditional sense is judgemental.  
The first half of section 194 shows that Wittgenstein 
explains what he calls ‘subjective certainty’ as conviction; it 
is the absence of doubt, he adds. The context does not 
determine whether ‘subjective certainty’ means epistemic 
subjective certainty as explained in section 2. Wittgen-
stein’s term ‘subjective certainty’ should be read as 
personal prejudgemental certainty, a notion that stands in 
opposition to public prejudgemental certainty (‘objective 
certainty’ in Wittgenstein’s sense). Because prejudge-
mental certainty is determined by a language-game, and 
thus learnt from others, the notion of public certainty is 
prior to that of personal certainty. What Wittgenstein calls 
‘subjective certainty’ is not to be identified with epistemic 
subjective certainty. Wittgenstein contrasts prejudgemental 
certainty with a state of being sure (308), and he explicitly 
says that a feeling of being sure is irrelevant to the 
certainties that interest him (524). Epistemic subjective 
certainty is a psychological state; the feelings that 
accompany this state in certain circumstances are not 
accidental. The criterion by which we can determine 




whether something is a certainty, according to Wittgen-
stein, is not whether we have a special feeling, but 
whether there is a distinction in acting with language. 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between subjective and objective 
certainty concerns exclusively a contrast on the level of 
prejudgemental certainty. He elucidates his notion of 
certainty by using terms that come close to subjective 
certainty in the epistemic sense, such as ‘conviction’ and 
‘to stand fast for us’. But, for Wittgenstein, if something 
stands fast for us, we are not expected to be able to give 
any epistemic ground. Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty is 
prejudgemental, whereas the epistemic notion of subjec-
tive certainty concerns judgement. His notion of certainty is 
thus essentially different from the epistemic one. Pre-
judgemental certainties cannot be expressed by declara-
tive sentences; they can only be shown by a practice, a 
way of acting and living.  
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